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Scriptural Reasoning and Inter-Faith Hermeneutics 
 
Nicholas Adams (University of Edinburgh) 
 
Scriptural reasoning is a well-established practice of text study between Jews, 
Christians and Muslims.
1
  Until recently it was located largely in university contexts, 
principally at the American Academy of Religion, but also in projects in the 
University of Virginia (led by one of the founders of scriptural reasoning, Peter 
Ochs), in Princeton (at the Center of Theological Inquiry) and in Cambridge (in the 
Faculty of Divinity, led by the Cambridge Inter-Faith Programme).  Over the last few 
years it has spread as a civic practice, especially in Virginia and in London.   
 
My task here is to answer the question: how fruitful might scriptural reasoning be as a 
model for inter-religious hermeneutics?  This question arises, in part, because of the 
perhaps surprising intensity with which scriptures are now at the heart of much inter-
faith encounter.  Making sense of this phenomenon requires us to consider different 
forms of this intense focus on scriptures, to describe them as fully as possible, and to 
consider the ways in which they present opportunities and challenges to relations 
between members of religious traditions.  I will claim that scriptural reasoning 
addresses certain quite specific needs among specific participants who share certain 
specific assumptions about their own traditions and their relations with others.  Part of 
my task will be to elaborate those assumptions.  The first part of my argument 
describes some of the features that I take scriptural reasoning to display.  The second 
part discusses issues of world-disclosure and problem-solving, and suggests why this 
way of thinking about inter-religious hermeneutics might be fruitful. I argue that 
scriptural reasoning offers an important contribution to inter-faith encounter in three 
ways.  First, it offers a model for privileging understanding above agreement; second, 
it enables the pursuit of collegiality without requiring consensus; third, it embodies 
the right relation between world-disclosure and problem-solving. 
 
Key Features of Scriptural Reasoning 
 
Scriptural reasoning is not the only practice of inter-faith engagement where 
participants read each others scriptures, in this case Tanakh, New Testament and 
Qur'an.  The Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem has an annual conference in 
which inter-faith 'hevruta' is conducted.
2
  As these two practices are often taken to be 
identical, and as it is useful to throw into relief what makes scriptural reasoning 
distinctive, comparing the two may offer some useful resources.
3
  I will refer to 
Hartman Hevruta and scriptural reasoning as names for the two types. 
 
To begin with, it is useful to identify what they share.  This is, in any case, what I 
think would strike any new participant who has an opportunity to participate.  A topic 
                                                 
1 See David Ford and CC Pecknold The Promise of Scriptural Reasoning (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); 
Nicholas Adams Habermas and Theology (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), pp. 234-255; David Ford 
Christian Wisdom (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), pp. 273-303; Peter Ochs and William Stacy Johnson 
(eds) Crisis, Call and Leadership in the Abrahamic Traditions (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 
2 www.hartmaninstitute.com,  For its own description of the theology conference see 
http://www.hartman.org.il/Center_Adv/Program_View.asp?Program_Id=9 (as at 19.5.10) 
3 For a blog which describes, in detail, a scriptural reasoning conversation see the description by 
Mike Higton 'A Session of Scriptural Reasoning' at http://goringe.net/theology/?p=179 (as at 
19.5.10) 
is chosen by a committee.  Scriptural texts relating to that topic are selected, along 
with commentary in the traditions.  Tanakh texts are normally chosen by Jews; New 
Testament texts are normally chosen by Christians; Qur'an texts are normally chosen 
by Muslims.  The scriptural texts are discussed in small groups of half a dozen people.  
These small groups are composed of members of the different traditions, although not 
always in equal numbers from each tradition.  Plenary sessions are held in which 
some of the issues are explored.  There is an explicit ethos: participants are not 
required to set aside their strong commitments to their traditions; they are not 
expected or encouraged to agree with each other about any specific issue; they are not 
attempting to solve some urgent problem using scriptural study as a method. 
 
There are, however, significant differences between the two practices. Hartman 
Hevruta scriptural texts are selected by an invited speaker, who also selects the 
commentary.  Texts are distributed at the opening of the conference.  The speaker 
introduces the texts, perhaps explaining why they were chosen.  The conference 
breaks up into small groups to study the texts.  The conference reconvenes as plenary, 
and the speaker presents some interpretations of the texts, after which there is 
opportunity for questions and wider discussion.  The texts from each tradition are 
given their own separate sessions: a day is spent on texts from one tradition; and a 
second day is spent on texts from a second tradition and so forth.  Small groups have 
one session for each of the traditions: one session on Jewish, one on Christian and one 
on Muslim texts.  In plenary discussion, questions and comments are first invited 
from members of the tradition whose texts are being studied, often called 'the inner 
circle'.  For example, if that day's study is devoted to Qur'an, hadith and mystical 
texts, it will be Muslims who engage first with the speaker, and the discussion will 
gradually be opened out to Jews and Christians after a suitable period.  The reason for 
this is sometimes explicitly stated for newcomers: to start with the 'inner circle' is to 
display the variety of interpretations within a tradition, and to ensure that a false 
homogeneity is not generated under pressure from questions outside the community. 
 
Scriptural reasoning texts are selected by a committee, who also select the 
commentary (although commentary may not be selected).  The texts are not normally 
introduced, but are distributed in advance, and members are encouraged to study them 
individually beforehand.  There are normally no named speakers.  The primary 
activity is small group study (also often called 'hevruta').  If there is a plenary 
gathering, because there is more than one small group, there may be some reporting 
back of what was discovered.  In some meetings, participants may be encouraged by 
the organisers to reflect on what they were doing, and in academic settings may be 
asked how it relates to the practices of the modern university, especially in relation to 
the study of scriptural texts.  The scriptural texts from the three traditions are 
presented together, and it is left to small groups to determine whether they study one 
or more texts from one tradition or multiple traditions.  It is quite common for small 
groups to meet several times during a meeting (over a few days) and to build up a set 
of readings of the texts.  By the end, it is expected that texts from the different 
traditions will interact with each other.  There is no requirement that members from a 
particular tradition will guide study of that tradition's texts, although this often 
happens in practice. 
 
Perhaps the most important difference is that Hartman Hevruta is a small, select group 
of some of the world's best scholars in Judaism, Christianity and Islam - they number 
perhaps fifty, and attendance is by invitation only.  Scriptural reasoning, by contrast, 
consciously seeks to reproduce itself in a variety of new contexts, and in a variety of 
different forms. 
 
This also introduces an important difference relating to who does this kind of text 
study.  Who is invited?  Who is not invited?  Can people be uninvited? Can people be 
excluded, and if so how are decisions made?  Where does executive power lie? 
 
It is hazardous to generalise too energetically on this question, as there are important 
differences depending on the kinds of group, how long they have been meeting, how 
well the participants know each other and so forth.  In the case of both Hartman 
Hevruta and scriptural reasoning, where there are groups that have been meeting for 
some time, over a period of years, and where there is well-established trust among the 
long-standing members from the three traditions, questions of this kind are handled 
through consultation by the organisers (who will typically come from all three 
traditions), with deference given to those organisers from the same tradition as the 
person or persons concerned.  In my experience of scriptural reasoning, it is generally 
Christians who invite Christians, Muslims who invite Muslims, Jews who invite Jews.  
Most people who participate in scriptural reasoning have been invited by someone 
from the same tradition (often called the same 'house').  The same is true for difficult 
cases where groups seem not to be flourishing because of disruptive behaviour.  In my 
experience, questions of exclusion are generally handled within houses; only where 
there are long-term relationships of trust are these matters discussed in front of 
members of other houses. 
 
An example may help to clarify some of these questions.  There is a group of scholars 
who meet annually to reflect on the role of scriptural reasoning in the academy.  It 
meets twice each year, for two or three days at a time.  It recently devoted two years 
to studying texts about women from Tanakh, New Testament and Qur'an.  These 
include narrative texts, such as those in Genesis relating to Jacob and his wives; and 
also more pastoral texts, such as Paul on relations between men and women in 
relation to God and the church, and Qur'anic texts about disciplining wives in relation 
to family life.  The group returned to the same texts in successive years, sometimes 
adding to or subtracting from them.  As the two years elapsed, the length of the 
scriptural passages presented for study was reduced.  This reflected the fact that the 
group was more deeply immersed in the texts, so that longer was required for each; it 
was also a practical consequence of an increased volume of commentary on the table.  
The introduction of commentary reflected a growing interest in the transmission of 
prior generations' readings of those same texts.  The group did not find these texts on 
women straightforward to read, and members of the small groups displayed keen 
awareness that these texts have been, and are, used to legitimate practices that are 
ungenerous at best and profoundly violent at worst.  The study proved immensely 
fruitful for discovering shared challenges to thinking about changing attitudes to 
women in the modern world, in each tradition, and for finding out differences of 
emphasis, different kinds of resistance to change, and different kinds of openness 
about the issues. 
 
Two aspects concerning the quality of discussion and the kinds of attitude it exhibits 
are especially noteworthy. First, it is obvious that discussion in scriptural reasoning is 
not primarily oriented to agreement.  It is oriented to understanding.  That means 
members of small groups are not trying to agree with each other about how to think 
about women in relation to families, husbands, fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters, 
religious life, religious authority, civic authority or the workplace.  If agreements are 
reached, that is interesting, and sometimes very highly valued.  But the main goal is to 
understand our own traditions, each others' traditions, and the relations between 
traditions on the issues under discussion. 
 
Second, instead of attempting to generate consensus within groups, the main fruits of 
discussion are perhaps best described as collegiality.  I mean this in the sense of 
forming a bond, in which there is the possibility of long-term shared action.  In 
scriptural reasoning there is no forming of a gang, or a new religious group.  In my 
experience of ten years of scriptural reasoning, consensus in the small groups has 
been rather rare, but there has been a steady flourishing of collegiality. 
 
This picture is partial, and some caveats need to be volunteered. First of all, I have 
been discussing scriptural reasoning as it takes place in the university.  The 
participants have typically undertaken advanced study in their religious traditions, 
have large internal libraries at their disposal, are aware of disagreements within their 
traditions, and can readily identify false claims about their traditions.  Rules for who 
speaks when, how authority is determined, and how disagreements are to be handled 
are all well established in the academic sphere.  But scriptural reasoning now also 
takes place in the civic realm, among participants who do not necessarily have this 
kind of background.  The Cambridge Inter-Faith Programme has conducted research  
into this, and its preliminary findings are that civic scriptural reasoning works best 
when the participants meet in their own traditions beforehand, and where they have a 
clearly articulated framework of expectations about handling disagreement, disruption 
and anxieties.
4
  This research is work in progress, but it is clear that scriptural 
reasoning outside the university has a distinctly different character. 
 
Second, I have not said anything about the rationale of those who do scriptural 
reasoning.  Why do they do it?  In answering this question, I think it is vital to 
remember that there are three different traditions in play.  In the modern university, 
we are used to having shared sets of rules for describing, analysing, interpreting and 
criticising things.  Consider feminist theory or post-colonial critique.  We are not 
quite in the habit of distinguishing Christian, Jewish and Muslim feminisms, or 
Jewish, Muslim and Christian post-colonial discourses.  We can do it if we try, but the 
habits are not deeply ingrained.  My second caveat is that where there are three 
traditions in play, there need to be three sets of descriptions, three sets of analysis, 
three sets of interpretations and three sets of critiques. 
 
In answer to the question, 'Why do scriptural reasoning?', mine is a Christian 
rationale.  I might experiment with imagining a Muslim rationale; if I had been 
attentive in other contexts I might even be able to report actual Muslim rationales.  
But I would be doing something quite different from speaking as a Christian, trying to 
                                                 
4 The research (funded by the Higher Education Innovation Fund and the Coexist Foundation) was 
carried out William Taylor, a Christian priest, whose report notes the need to consider the different 
qualities that may be displayed by scriptural reasoning when it is led by members of different 
traditions  A Christian-led group may be significantly different from a Muslim-led group: further 
investigation is needed. 
make sense of my own tradition's ways of understanding hospitality and love of one's 
neighbour. 
 
To summarise, three slogans can be generated: 
 
(1) Understanding above Agreement. 
(2) Collegiality above Consensus. 
(3) Not one account of (or rationale for) scriptural reasoning, but three. 
 
I claimed earlier that scriptural reasoning addresses certain specific needs among 
those who have certain specific assumptions.  Where those needs and assumptions are 
absent, scriptural reasoning may not be fruitful.  The needs will take us into the 
second part of this enquiry, on world-disclosure and problem-solving.   
 
One of the assumptions among participants in scriptural reasoning that the three 
traditions are likely to persist, in relation to each other, for the long term.  There is no 
prospect of mass conversions from one tradition to another; no prospect of agreement 
on some of the core issues at the heart of the traditions' accounts of each other; no 
prospect of consensus on matters of interpretation of sacred texts.  There is also no 
cause for worry in the face of this lack of prospects.  To put it rather crudely: if 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam are features of the world until the eschaton, it is 
probably wise to develop modes of understanding disagreement that are well fitted for 
the long haul. Such modes should generate higher quality disagreement if they are 
done well.  This is an urgent need.  Those who are experienced in inter-religious 
engagement frequently report that one of the most serious problems is that fellow 
participants often do not know even the basics of one's tradition, and that one is 
forced to run roughshod over the subtleties and complexities of one's traditions, 
ironing out disagreements where they matter greatly.  A Muslim colleague once put it 
to me like this: when I argue with Christians I find that often I am not arguing at all, 
but teaching Islam 101.'  If practices like scriptural reasoning can help produce better 
quality disagreement, that is a significant contribution. 
 
World-disclosure and Problem-solving 
 
Consider the following text from the New Testament. 
 
‘The first is, “Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is one; you shall love 
the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your 
mind, and with all your strength.” The second is this, “You shall love your 
neighbour as yourself.” There is no other commandment greater than these.’ 
(Mark 12:29-31)
5
 
 
This text, repeated with variations in the Gospels of Matthew (Mt 22:37-40) and Luke 
(Lk 10:25-28), offers a striking juxtaposition and combination of the two tasks of 
philosophy: world-disclosure and problem-solving. 
 
The two terms world-disclosure and problem-solving became significant foci of 
debate after their use by Jürgen Habermas in his critiques of Heidegger and Derrida in 
                                                 
5 New Revised Standard edition 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.
6
  The term world-disclosure (Weltentdeckung) 
is elaborated in Heidegger's discussions of the ways in which we occupy a horizon of 
meanings which appear in various ways, and are especially disclosed through poetry.  
Habermas famously insists on a differentiation of the tasks of poetry and literature, 
which quite properly disclose the world to us, and philosophy, which discharges a 
different task, namely, solving problems through habits of argumentation.  Habermas 
strongly argues against Derrida who, in Habermas' account, elides these two tasks in 
his descriptions of philosophy as akin to literary criticism. 
 
Habermas is prompted to raise these issues because he discerns a tendency to elide 
judgements of truth with judgements of taste which accompanies, he argues, a 
tendency to elide problem-solving and world-disclosure.  If one is to distinguish 
judgements of truth from judgements of taste, one needs to distinguish practices of 
self-expression from philosophy's specialised practices of argumentation.  I think 
Habermas is right to be prompted by this worry, but, as I have argued in more detail 
elsewhere, I think his solution offers too much clarity about the tasks of philosophy.
7
  
Rather than articulate 'the tasks of philosophy' or identify 'what philosophers should 
do', it seems more fruitful to identify actual practices which seem to model the right 
relationship between problem-solving and world-disclosure, and to make sense of 
them.  I find in scriptural reasoning just such a model.  It is possible that some 
practices of some philosophers offer other models of this kind, but it is striking that 
Habermas does not offer detailed investigations into such practices – his tendency is 
to generalise about 'philosophy', and I see this as a weakness.  I argue that in scriptural 
reasoning questions of truth do not become elided with questions of taste.  Rather, the 
practice of scriptural reasoning makes most sense if one interprets truth-claims as 
products of chains of reasoning that rest on axioms, and acknowledges that what is 
axiomatic for one participant may be hypothetical for another. These condensed 
remarks call for elaboration. 
 
I consider these themes as signs of a familiar problem in modern philosophy: the 
tendency to separate things that belong together and then trying (often unsuccessfully) 
to find some way to join them again. 
 
World-disclosure evokes the horizon of meanings against which we make sense of our 
actions and our place in the world.  This horizon is disclosed when we encounter 
things that cause us to notice the patterns of meaningfulness in which we are 
embedded.  Whenever we struggle to make sense of something, or are obliged to 
interpret something rather than encounter it unthinkingly, the web of the world's 
meanings for us is disclosed.  Death, the sublime, the poetic: these are all occasions 
for world-disclosure. 
 
Problem-solving directs attention to the formation and testing of hypotheses, with the 
purpose of responding to some problem in the world.  It identifies fallacies, highlights 
ambiguities, proposes patterns for inquiry, establishes rules for testing claims, settles 
criteria for success and failure.  Marxist analyses of economic injustice, Freudian 
analyses of psychological complexes, critical-theoretical analyses of authoritarianism: 
                                                 
6 Jürgen Habermas Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (tr. F Lawrence, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1987), pp.131-160 (esp. pp.147-154) pp.185-210 (esp. pp. 205-209). 
7 Nicholas Adams Habermas and Theology (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), esp. pp. 234-255. 
these would all be examples of problem-solving, as would activities such as 
investigating questions of medical ethics or law from a philosophical perspective. 
 
In the language of the Christian tradition (and perhaps others) world-disclosure can be 
heard as an echo of the commandment to love God, and problem-solving can be heard 
as an echo of the commandment to love our neighbour.  To love God is to know 
ourselves called to participate in an agency that is not ours, to turn to God forsaking 
all other gods, and to attune our hearts and lives to God's service.  It is simultaneously 
to identify the world as God's creation and to discover our place in it.  To love our 
neighbour is to recognise our social embeddedness, to respond to another's suffering, 
to turn to those in need and to serve them.  It is simultaneously to identify our 
neighbours and to participate in God's relation to creation.  World-disclosure sounds 
the note of worship; problem-solving sounds the note of healing. 
 
If Habermas' diagnosis is right, it appears that the twentieth century saw something of 
a polarisation of these two ways of thinking about philosophy.  On the one hand, 
Heidegger and Gadamer made a hermeneutic turn with slogans such as 'Language is 
the house of being' (Heidegger) or 'Being that can be understood is language' 
(Gadamer).  These were accompanied by evocative readings of Hölderlin's poetry and 
sustained interest in the ways in which tradition exercises authority over the thinking 
subject.  Likewise, in the middle of the twentieth century, analytical philosophy in the 
English-speaking world comprehensively turned away from questions of flourishing 
and suffering towards narrowly focused questions about well-formed sentences and 
the criteria for identifying meaningful or meaningless claims.  At the same time, the 
Frankfurt School developed a critical theory that was focused on questions of 
flourishing and suffering; it developed responses to inadequate conceptions of 'reason' 
and articulating for philosophy its vocation as a problem-solving enterprise.  
Habermas' sustained critiques of Heidegger and Gadamer (and later Derrida and 
others) - oriented to their reluctance to articulate the vocation of philosophy as 
critique - is emblematic of these contrasting conceptions of philosophy. 
 
The analogy with the two great commandments reveals two forms of one-sidedness in 
Heidegger and Habermas.  On the one side, we have a turn towards the love of God 
divorced from love of neighbour - world-disclosure that neglects problem-solving.  
On the other side we have a turn towards the love of neighbour without love of God - 
problem-solving that neglects world-disclosure. 
 
In the twenty-first century, this polarisation is well understood, and various attempts 
are made to overcome it.  The work of JM Bernstein, Andrew Bowie and Peter Dews, 
and most explicitly the work of Nikolas Kompridis, exemplifies this well.
8
  Their 
projects address the ways in which responses to suffering are bound up in complex 
ways with questions of what is now called aesthetics but which in older times would 
simply be called beauty. 
 
                                                 
8 Fred Dallmayr Life-World, Modernity and Critique (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), J.M. Bernstein 
Recovering Ethical Life (London: Routledge: 1995); Andrew Bowie Aesthetics and Subjectivity 
(Manchester UP: 2003), Music, Philosophy and Modernity (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), Peter Dews 
The Idea of Evil (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), Nikolas Kompridis Critique and Disclosure: Critical 
Theory Between Past and Future (MIT: 2006).  
What is more significant for those interested in inter-faith hermeneutics is the 
recognition that both the problem (the polarisation in Heidegger and Habermas) and 
the repair (in Bernstein and others) is often pursued in a way that recognises its 
theological character, but does not engage with the problems theologically.  Nearly 
every major philosopher today is engaged in some kind of 'religious turn', in the sense 
of paying attention to the role of religious practices and beliefs.  This includes the 
recent work of Habermas himself.
9
  Whether sympathetic or hostile, religious life is 
hard to ignore.  This is not quite the same as paying attention to theology, by which I 
mean here acknowledging and investigating the long histories of scriptural 
interpretation, development of doctrine, and debates about practices of worship with a 
view to addressing contemporary concerns. 
 
It is striking that the turn to 'tradition' and 'horizons of meaning' in Heidegger and 
others, as well as the turn to 'suffering' and 'communicative action' in Habermas, is not 
presented as a recovery of any tradition in particular, nor to any particular teaching 
about who the neighbour is, to whose suffering I should respond, and in response to 
whose claims I should seek to reach understanding in the public sphere. 
 
The best critics of Heidegger and Habermas recognise that the split between world-
disclosure and problem-solving is not due to a failure of individual philosophers to 
keep them together.  The work of Heidegger and Habermas expresses actual trends 
and ruptures in cultural life.  Keeping the two dimensions of thought in proper 
relation to each other is not a matter of fixing mistakes in the philosophical arguments 
of Heidegger and Habermas.  It is more a question of diagnosing how the split is 
displayed in various cultural forms.  For example, Kant's split between truth, moral 
worth and aesthetic judgement is not his own invention but reflects the already 
growing trend to separate fact and value, or the socially widespread belief that matters 
of 'taste' are not amenable to argumentation.  Heidegger and Habermas do not cause 
the split: they reflect a split that already exists.  They also deepen it. 
 
One can readily identify tendencies in cultural life today that seem to justify a 
separation of world-disclosure from problem-solving.  Music, poetry, literature and 
worship are generally viewed as 'expressive'.  Medicine, pharmaceuticals, engineering 
and politics are generally viewed as 'practical'.  Music discloses worlds.  Medicine 
solves problems.   
 
The best philosophers recognise this and engage in careful detailed analysis of the 
ways in which seemingly separate spheres of human action are in fact deeply involved 
with each other.  Andrew Bowie's recent Music, Philosophy and Modernity is a model 
of this kind of work.  He shows how questions of musical expression are thoroughly 
bound up with questions of language and ethics, for example.
10
  The striking feature 
of this kind of work is that it does not try to take two separate things and fuse them, 
but patiently diagnoses the ways in which the seemingly separate things are, in fact, 
already joined.  This does not deny that there are attempts by reputable philosophers 
to consider them separate.  Yet it does recognise that treating them as separate is not a 
merely academic mistake: it systematically distorts our ability to make sense of  a 
                                                 
9 e.g. Jürgen Habermas The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); Jürgen Habermas 
and Joseph Ratzinger The Dialectics of Secularization (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2005); Between 
Naturalism and Religion (tr. C Cronin, Cambridge: Polity, 2008) 
10 Andrew Bowie Music, Philosophy and Modernity (Cambridge: CUP, 2007) 
range of human actions.  It ceases to be obvious, as it should be, that universities are 
for forming young persons' characters as well as for developing cognitive skills or 
stretching the imagination.  It ceases to be obvious, as it should be, that hospitals are 
places where people confront their deepest hopes and fears as well as diseases and 
their unwelcome symptoms and consequences. 
 
Despite the modern tendency to separate complex inter-relating patterns of action that 
belong together, the complexities are stubbornly resistant in a positive way, and it is a 
mark of the best philosophical investigation that it recognises the already connected 
patterns of human action, and works towards better models and maps, rather than 
trying -  through super-human but ultimately vain effort - to force seemingly separate 
things together. 
 
This detour into philosophical territory leads us back to scriptural reasoning.  Reading 
scriptures can be a model for addressing and embodying the relation between 
disclosing the world and solving problems, in a way that does not neglect important 
theological dimensions.  The narratives of God's creation of the world, the 
establishment and renewal of covenant with Israel, the pursuit of wisdom, Jesus' 
preaching and healing: these all simultaneously disclose the world, name its suffering, 
and describe its healing.  It is worth repeating that mine is a distinctively Christian 
account of scriptural reasoning, and that this remains inadequate until it is joined by 
corresponding Jewish and Muslim accounts. 
 
While world-disclosure and problem-solving are constantly in relation to each other in 
scripture, they are not in relation to each other in the same way for the communities 
that read scripture.  Peter Ochs has suggested that in times of peace and prosperity, it 
is the disclosure of the world that is the dominant note: the evocation of what world it 
is that we live in, the description of who we are in relation to God and the world, and 
in relation to each other.  In times of suffering and pain, it is the repair of the world 
that comes to the fore: the restoration of the wounded covenant, the healing of the 
sick, the atonement.
11
 
 
The reader of greatest service to the community is the one who knows how to 
interpret scripture in such a way as to disclose the world and indicate its repair in 
ways that describe the community in relation to its circumstances, whether in times of 
peace or of suffering. 
 
In scriptural reasoning we do not read for 'the community' in this way, because we are 
at least three communities.  I say 'at least', because once Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam have been named, this merely begins the process of describing the communities 
from which readers come.  I do not only mean that within Judaism there are 
Orthodox, Conservative and Progressive forms, that within Christianity there are 
Eastern and Western traditions, or that within Islam there are Sunni and Shi'a 
traditions.  Admittedly, these are important clarifications.  I mean that there are also 
traditions of reading learned in the university, and that these have strikingly different 
philosophical formations.  Rationalist, Idealist and Pragmatist styles of reasoning cut 
across religious traditions.  This often happens in such a way that a Christian and a 
                                                 
11 Peter Ochs 'Scripture' in David Ford, Ben Quash and Janet Martin Soskice (eds) Fields of Faith: 
Theology and Religious Studies in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: CUP, 2005) pp. 104-118 
Jew who are both pragmatists may often reach stronger and deeper understanding 
with each other than two Christians, one of whom is a rationalist, the other a 
pragmatist, even if the two Christians belong to the same narrow denomination. 
 
Because there are at least three communities, the qualities of world-disclosure and 
problem-solving are significantly different from how they appear within any one of 
the three broad Abrahamic houses.  They are different first of all because the 
scriptures are different.  Again, these differences are at least three.  At the most basic 
level, the scriptures themselves are different.  There is the Tanakh, the Christian Bible 
and the Qur’an.  At the next level, there are some interesting complexities: the 
Tanakh, interpreted by Talmud is in some sense the same text as the Old Testament, 
interpreted by Patristic theology.  Yet the Tanakh exists in the Masoretic (Hebrew) 
and Septuagint (Greek) versions, which are not the same as each other.  And of course 
many of the narratives of the Bible are repeated, often with significant variations, in 
the Qur’an.  At the highest level of complexity, the texts are obviously not read ‘cold’, 
by and large, but are refracted and received through generations of commentary, 
which is often commentary on commentary.  The lines of commentary spiral in many 
different directions.  In my own tradition, nearly every theologians knows what is 
meant if one refers to Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Schleiermacher, or 
Barth in relation to how they read scripture.  The same fine-grained issues are also 
found in Jewish and Muslim commentary on scripture.  
 
There is an interesting feature of scriptural reasoning in relation to these questions of 
world-disclosure and problem-solving, however.  The scriptural texts may be different 
between the Abrahamic traditions, and the lines of diverse commentary may be 
different within each tradition.  But the problems faced by these communities are 
peculiar in that the communities have often been the problem for each other.  
Engagements between Christians and Muslims have often been what prompted certain 
interpretations of scripture, especially in the high middle ages.  Engagements between 
Jews and Christians to a significant extent prompted their attempts to secure their 
particular identities.  For Jews, Christians and Muslims to turn to scripture to repair 
these problems is to see their religious differences - displayed in their different 
scriptures and their different habits of interpreting scriptures - as part of the solution, 
as well as a source of severe problems. 
 
I take seriously Habermas' concern that to elide philosophy with literary criticism 
risks eliding judgements of truth with judgements of taste.  In the context of such a 
concern, it might appear that scriptural reasoning is concerned only with judgements 
of taste: that it is a practice where different interpretations are juxtaposed, but 
judgements of truth are indefinitely postponed.  It might seem that if there are three 
sets of descriptions, three sets of texts and three traditions of interpretation - each with 
its own historically specific categories - questions of truth must surely be off the table.  
This proves not to be the case, however. 
 
It is not an easy matter to talk of 'religious truth-claims' in general, given the different 
histories of argumentation inherited in Judaism, Christianity and Islam.  Restricting  
remarks to my own Christian tradition does not solve all of the problems, but it does 
significantly reduce the scope for confusion.  It is worth considering Christian truth-
claims, such as 'Jesus is fully God and fully man' or 'God is three in one'.  These 
claims are not generally presented as the concluding parts of a chain of reasoning, 
although at a certain point in the history of Christian theology they did have this 
status.  They were once answers to questions.  Today, they are presented as axioms.  
To treat these claims as axioms is part of what it means to be a Christian.  It is quite 
possible to treat these claims as hypotheses instead (as one might when teaching 
doctrine - to demonstrate what is at stake, and what kinds of argument support the 
claims) but emphatically to transform axioms of this kind into hypotheses is probably 
to cease being a Christian theologian.  These claims are not seriously in doubt in 
Christian theology.  If they are not taken to be true, then much liturgical practice 
becomes mere spectacle, and ceases to enact the renewal of those who meet 'in 
Christ'. 
 
As well as the claims themselves having an axiomatic status, the categories in which 
they are posed, and the categories in which further explication of their meaning is 
couched, also have a special status.  Unlike categories such as 'substance', 'time', 
'language' or 'knowledge', which undergo periodic radical reinterpretation in the 
philosophical tradition, theology is marked by other more stable categories such as 
'grace', 'love', 'faith', 'hope'.  These categories certainly undergo change over time, but 
it is significantly slower than what one sees in more provisional philosophical 
categories.  To engage in a radical reinterpretation of 'grace' is as theologically 
problematic as converting core axioms such as 'Jesus is fully God and fully man' into 
hypotheses: it is probably to suspend one's membership of the tradition. 
 
Scriptural reasoning is an interesting context in which to consider the articulation of 
such axioms, couched in such categories.  It is interesting because when there are 
three traditions in play, there are different inherited histories of axioms and categories 
in play.  A Christian who claims, 'Jesus is fully God and fully man' takes this to be an 
axiom.  A Jew who utters the same words can only entertain it as an hypotheses: to do 
otherwise would be to become a Christian.  Similarly a Christian who explores this 
claim by drawing on categories such as 'grace' has quite a limited scope of manoeuvre 
in regard to its meanings, and is not free to abandon the category in the face of 
challenges or difficulties.  To be a Christian theologian is to be prepared to shoulder 
the difficulties associated with categories like 'grace', and to work through problems 
that may arise.  A Muslim who investigates the claim about Jesus' divinity and 
humanity is not constrained in the same way.  He may entertain the use of a category 
like 'grace', but he can be relatively free in the interpretation of this, and - because it is 
not a central Islamic category - is free to jettison it in favour of other seemingly more 
fruitful categories. 
 
The matter can be put plainly.  What is axiomatic for a Christian may be hypothetical 
for a Jew; a category which is inviolable for a Christian may be a matter of 
indifference for a Muslim. 
 
I would argue that this phenomenon nicely shows how truth-claims are by no means 
abandoned or ruled out in scriptural reasoning.  The claim, 'Jesus is fully God and 
fully man' is a truth-claim.  But its status is different in each tradition.  It is not a 
matter of it being 'true for me but false for you'.  It is a truth-claim which is either true 
or false.  There is no 'for me' in matters of truth.  But there is an obvious difference, 
which has practical consequences, between taking it as an axiom and taking it as an 
hypothesis.  Similarly, there is no expectation that members of different traditions will 
make use of the same categories, or - if they do so - accord them the same 
inviolability or provisionality.  Again this has practical consequences: for prayer, for 
witness, for self-understanding. 
 
If one is serious about inter-faith encounter, where participants are able to engage as 
members of their traditions, without bracketing their habits of action and thought, and 
without surrendering their deeply formed identities, truth-claims must surely play a 
full role in that encounter.  Admittedly there is more to a religious tradition than truth 
claims, but without them it is not clear that there is anything to those traditions at all. 
 
It is a regrettably common experience in inter-faith dialogue to find Christians saying  
strange things like 'I am a follower of Jesus (peace be upon Him)'; or to hear Christian 
prayers in which mention of Jesus or the Trinity is tactfully omitted; or even to 
discover that the 'Old Testament' is conveniently (but temporarily) transformed into 
the 'Hebrew Bible'.  Scriptural reasoning is a practice which has the capacity to 
abolish these awkwardnesses.  This is because, in each case, they arise because of the 
mistaken belief that the situation requires a form of words that is acceptable to all.  
Scriptural reasoning permits the acknowledgement that the situation actually requires 
different forms of words, or identical forms of words that are treated differently by 
members of the three traditions.  It is Muslims who say, 'peace be upon him', not 
Christians; it is Christians and not Jews or Muslims who pray in the name of Jesus 
Christ; it is Jews who read the Tanakh and Christians who read the Old Testament.  
This is a natural extension of the insight that what is axiomatic for me may be 
hypothetical for you. 
 
These considerations may not matter terribly much if inter-faith dialogue is a meeting 
between those who are relatively liberal, theologically speaking, or those who have 
studied each other's traditions in enough depth to address each other fluently in each 
other's native languages.  But if one seeks inter-faith encounter between orthodox 
Jews, evangelical Christians and traditional Muslims, a robust framework is needed.  
Scriptural reasoning has proven to be resilient in the context of such meetings, 
perhaps because each person speaks confidently from the depths of his or her 
tradition, with no need to establish a common ground on which to build such speech.  
Instead of requiring common ground, scriptural reasoning distributes axioms and 
hypotheses asymmetrically, assigns categories different statuses, and not only permits 
but requires participants to speak in their own tongues. 
 
Conclusion 
 
These remarks on scriptural reasoning can be concluded with a brief summary.  
Scriptural reasoning is a practice of inter-faith encounter that is particularly hospitable 
to those who are not confident that common ground can be found with members of 
other traditions.  It is cheerfully agnostic about whether such common ground is 
available: it does not require it and nor does it rule it out.  Scriptural reasoning is a 
practice that is structurally sceptical, in a low-key way, about whether consensus on 
important issues is likely to be found.  The discovery of common ground and the 
generation of consensus are possible outcomes, but they are not necessary conditions. 
 
Instead, it encourages practices of textual study in which understanding is privileged 
above agreement.  If the product is higher quality disagreement rather than the 
abolition of disagreement - in other words, if the disagreements are actually 
intensified in certain respects - this is a mark of success, not failure.  It encourages 
habits of engagement in which collegiality is privileged above consensus.  
Collegiality is a friendly term for engaging long-term with those with whom one 
anticipates sustained and persistent disagreements.  But it is also more than this.  
Disagreements actually require a good deal of agreement: on terms of reference, on 
the questions being posed, on what is at stake.  Beyond this, scriptural reasoning 
permits persistent divergence on which categories are in play, and on the status of 
those categories which are shared.  It perhaps sounds rather bleak, but scriptural 
reasoning permits the persistence of indifference in relation to certain questions, 
certain claims and certain categories. 
 
Scriptural reasoning also finely balances the needs of world-disclosure and problem-
solving.  It is neither exclusively narrative nor one-sidedly reparative.  It can be 
practised in order to discover what kind of world one's colleagues take us to be living 
in; it can be undertaken to fix damaged relations or to broaden restricted imaginations.  
It simultaneously acknowledges the command to love God and love one's neighbour: 
reading scriptures enacts obedience to both commands simultaneously. 
 
Finally, it is worth repeating a desideratum that this paper necessarily fails to meet.  
There need to be three sets of description of scriptural reasoning; three sets of 
categories; three histories of interpretation.  My presentation attempts to display the 
virtue of acknowledging this need, but it obviously cannot discharge its tasks.  To 
discover whether scriptural reasoning is a suitable model for inter-faith hermeneutics, 
it is necessary to add at least two more voices.  I suggest that one of the possible 
modes of action in which such voices can be added is to practise scriptural reasoning 
and not merely talk about it. 
